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Can international relations (IR) be a distinctive discipline? In the present paper 
I argue that such a discipline would be a social science that could be formulated 
within the perspective of comparative paradigms. The objections to scientific 
methods are thus overcome by the logic of international oppositions, in other 
words a model takes several paradigms into account and considers three kinds 
of foreign relation (enemy, friend, and rival) in the light of three main questions: 
what is IR about (ontology); what does relate therein (epistemology); and how to 
assess such a relation (logic). 
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Introduction: What is IR? 
Roughly speaking, the ‘international relations’ is the study of relations among nations. 
Therefore, it deals with foreign policy. But what does a ‘nation’ mean as distinct from its 
twin concept of a state? In the present paper I would like to deal with this issue by investi-
gating the foundations of the so-called theory of international relations (hereafter, IR), to-
gether with the possibility of its formalization from a logical point of view. In what fol-
lows, I investigate three main domains helping to face this challenge having assumed 
a formal philosophy of global processes for the method of my study. 
Ontology (who?) 
The first domain is the ontology of IR: What sort of being is there, that is what are the 
political categories that matter in such a discipline? Ontology is the domain of philosophy 
concerned with the identity of agents; in short, it purports to answer the following ques-
tion: What are the relata a,b in any international relations of the form R(a,b)? The plausible 
candidates for these are states, regional alliances, transnational firms, non-governmental 
organizations, mere individuals, and the like.  
Epistemology (what?) 
The second domain is the epistemology of IR which concerns the relation R in itself, 
namely: What is the nature of the relation between any two specified relata?  
Because of the troublesome distinction between facts and interpretations, the problem 
here is how to characterize a relation: by means of a natural or a human science whose 
methodological rules crucially differ. As the German philosopher of culture Wilhelm 
Dilthey (1833–1911) stated, ‘We explain nature; we understand psychic life’. For this rea-
son, a genuine theory of IR should be clarified either through the explanation (causal dis-
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course) or through the understanding (intentional discourse) it is supposed to provide in 
order to make sense of any given ‘fact’.  
On the one hand, the sort of discourse attached to a given political event may differ 
following the Aristotelian fourfold set of causes, whether these are material (the material 
conditions under which an event happen), efficient (the agents who caused the event), 
formal (the definition of the event), or final (the reason why some event was provoked by 
some agents).  
On the other hand, the kind of cause the IR theorist tends to choose actually depends 
upon the sort of questions she/he naturally asks before making her/his point; indeed, ques-
tions make sense of events and relevantly betray the questioner's assumptions. We will 
return to this crucial role of questions with the case of paradigms, as implicit theoretical 
representations in the construction of IR. This role is all the more crucial for whoever 
doubts the positivist view that facts are transparent data.  
To put it blantly: what is a fact? Against the positivist dream of a Sirius point from 
which any situation could be easily depicted, it hardly makes sense to assume a theorist 
asking neutral questions. A radically opposed view has been endorsed by the Frankfurt 
School and famously stated by the post-positivist Robert Cox in the following words: 
‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’, thus discarding the common belief 
in bare facts. Correspondingly, the choice of specific questions to make sense of political 
events may lead to such paradigms as realism, liberalism, or some more fine-grained vari-
ants. Their level of abstraction may vary, according to the theoretical concerns that make 
them arise: any investigation about the geopolitical strategy of a state leads to technical 
questions about material resources, for example, while a larger reflection about the moti-
vations of mankind resort to the more general domain of political philosophy and leads to 
what may be called ‘meta-questions’ (abstract questions about more concrete questions). 
To account for the complexification of world politics throughout the notion of global-
ization, the paper aims at describing the transition from state-centred relations to Global 
Studies by means of an inquiry into the construction of a world space and through the set 
of social interrelation networks. Such a large-scale ambition may lead to a disciplinary 
holism, in the sense that such a large topic as IR calls for a number of related disciplines 
from politics to other social sciences like sociology (religion and culture), anthropology 
(human nature), psychology (folk behavior, statesmen's rationale), or economics (geopo-
litical motivations).  
A natural objection to this project concerns its philosophical flavor. After all, the story 
of the world patently showed how the history of ideas departs from the history of nations. 
From Plato's expedition in Syracuse to utopian speculations, recall these words by Freder-
ick II of Prussia (1712–1786) that summarize some reluctance in the air at floating abstrac-
tions, ‘If I wished to punish a province, I would have it governed by philosophers’.  
The king argued by these words against the liberal-minded view of Enlightenment phi-
losophers, among which Rousseau's concept of general will or Kant's project of perpetual 
peace. At the same time, it should be noted that not every philosopher is a liberal thinker. 
Think about Hobbes' republican absolutism, or Heidegger's fascination for the Third 
Reich. Notwithstanding a common opinion of the effect that philosophy distorts reality,  
I would reply that the present paper aims at a philosophy for IR rather than a theory of IR 
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for philosophers. In short, the point is not to give a prescriptive view of what IR should be 
but, rather, to think speculatively about what IR might be, without any definite answer and 
by means of proper interrogative methods.  
Accordingly, philosophy is not to be taken as a field of ideologists or idealists opposed 
to the so-called ‘internationalists’, that is the theorists of IR whose favored domain would 
be the field of action and pragmatics. There are two main objectives of the next sections: 
to break with this shared view and to show how both domains are interrelated. 
Logic (how?) 
Finally, the third domain is the logic of IR: How to account for the sort of relation R 
between the relata a, b in R(a, b)?  
Against a positivist stance that claims to penetrate reality and its facts with one-sided 
answers, the primary role I impute to questions in the very process of a theory leads to  
a ‘logic of IR’ in a larger sense of the word, that is a guess-who game, where a variety of 
questions makes sense of political events without giving a final answer to the question 
how the world politics is ruled. While this method has already been applied in other con-
texts by means of a so-called Question-Answer Semantics (see, e.g., Schang 2012), I sug-
gest to organize the content of IR in the form of a qualitative model with coefficients (see 
Section 3).  
By doing so, a difference must be made between what is meant by a paradigm and an 
ideology (compare with the debate between Kuhn and Feyerabend about the legitimacy of 
natural science) and be able to overcome the oversimplifying dichotomy between philoso-
phy (orating about morality) and politics (aiming at efficiency). In particular, such an en-
terprise amounts to a formalization of IR towards a continuist dynamics: enduring ques-
tions may lead to changing answers, in order to account for (giving a sense to) the theory 
of IR and its numerous ‘-isms’ (realism, liberalism, neo-structuralism, culturalism, marx-
ism, constructivism, and so on). In case of successful results, formal epistemology of IR 
has to clarify their technical parlance and numerous concepts related to the previous areas 
of ontology and epistemology. A sample of it is given by what the French internationalist 
Jean-Louis Martres said about his German fellow Alexander Wendt (who depicts himself 
as a ‘constructivist’ or second-rank theorist, strives to establish the identity of neo-liberal 
and neo-realist views, both relying upon an ‘ontological atomism and an epistemological 
positivism’); in short, Martres blames both neo-liberal and neo-realist theories for reifying 
instances, whether the agent, the state, or the world system (Martres 2008: 34). 
Let us review in detail the way in which IR can be characterized in its foundations and 
prospects. 
1. The Object: State vs Country 
Let us consider again the primary question: what is the object of IR?  
The traditional answer is state-centrism, according to which the IR deals with nothing 
but states since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). In the same vein, the French politologist 
Raymond Aron (1905–1983) depicted IR as the set of relations between states that are en-
dowed with the monopoly of legitimate physical violence (for external war and inner re-
pression). This means that political relations are uniquely about states, insofar as these rule 
armies and are entitled to declare war against foreign powers. The American international-
ist Kenneth Waltz (1924–2013) summed up this classical view by a reductio argument, 
‘For what can act on the international scene, if not states?’ 
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In contradistinction to such a mainstream approach, I want to formulate a plea for po-
litical pluralism which is an alternative view stating that IR is not so much about states or 
even nations than countries, so to a wide extent it is the agents that matter. Thus, the Eng-
lish Susan Strange was depicted as blaming the abuse of state-centrism in political science: 
Being exclusively interested in the state (state-centrism) is oversimplifying and leads to 
develop a conception of political science that does not help understand human condition 
and does not take into account the various entities having an economic and political power 
(Tooze 2001: 103). 
Borrowing from an analogy of the American philosopher Willard van Orman Quine, 
countries are not homogenous entities but, rather, force fields composed of contradictory 
forces. They include military forces (states), but also economic forces (multinational firms, 
transnational holdings, lobbies) and social movements (undergrounds organizations, ethnic 
minorities, leagues of civil rights). To manage these contradictory forces and ensure their 
foreign policy, states have to do with such ‘inner enemies’ to maintain their coercive force 
and attempt to legitimate what Aron referred to as the monopoly of physical violence. 
While state-centrism assumes that states are the only efficient forces in IR, the aforemen-
tioned counter-forces often occur from the public opinion, especially medias.  
And conversely, a more comprehensive approach to IR should take into account the 
influential role of medias over mass beliefs: sometimes medias serve as a public weapon 
against the state policy; sometimes the states employ them to turn public opinion into 
a general will. It results in a two-fold behavior, that is to construct an official propaganda 
of state-nations or to provoke a reaction of public opinion against the state's action. The 
role of propaganda corroborates a previous objection to the positivist belief in bare facts, 
insofar as the power of mass media constructs a collective picture of reality beyond its 
duty to tell the truth to educated people.  
Concerning the very nature of the relata a,b in the general scheme R(a,b) embedding 
IR, a difference is to be made between state, nation, and country. Just as a state organizes 
the inner policy in a country, a nation means a homogeneous set of people ruled by a state 
(state-nation) whereas a country is the spatial territory on which a state rules its given na-
tion. My emphasis upon countries thereby enlarges the scope of IR while avoiding to reify 
the state as a static representation of a standing nation. Instead of talking about such static 
elements, the general trend of the following goes towards a dynamic approach to countries 
as the proper relata of IR A balance is to be found between total order and total chaos, as 
argued by Martres, neglecting slyness removes the agent while favoring deep forces and 
trends; extolling the uniqueness of a phenomenon cancels any logicality to the system of 
international relations and leads to chaos. 
For this purpose, a reference to countries amounts to a set of moving forces whose in-
terrelations are supposed to make sense of the worldwide history. Once the agents are 
identified (in a provisory way, at the very least), let us consider the nature of their relation 
in any foreign policy. What are they doing exactly that justifies the construction of a the-
ory of IR?  
2. The Relation: Force vs Power 
Here is the second question of our inquiry: Which sort of relation stands in IR?  
A brief overview of the origins helps to give a preliminary answer. Let us note indeed that 
the discipline has been founded to understand and warrant the conditions of peace between 
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states; it has been created in 1919 by the Welsh sponsor David Davies, who supported the 
first professorship of international politics at the University College of Wales in Aberyst-
wyth. Despite this primary goal of stable peaceful relations between states exhausted by 
the First World War, the breakdown of the League of Nations and the subsequent the Sec-
ond World War dramatically showed a patent failure of idealist optimism from the twen-
ties onwards and led to the shared conclusion that international right, democracy, and free 
trade would not be sufficient conditions for peace. In this sense, the external anarchy be-
tween states marked the triumph of state-centrism and the related view that states are the 
only necessary organizations of human societies. This accounts for the fall of idealism and 
the rise of realism, given the historical context of the young discipline.  
A philosophical, more general assessment of the situation consists in saying that the 
theory of IR is nothing but a social science whose agents are naturally determined by hu-
man desires, including power. Thus, any realist would say that she/he aims at assessing the 
action of states through their essential search for power. Note that while the realists equate 
power with the aggressive or offensive way to satisfy one's own interests, such a concept is 
not as clear as it stands. As a matter of fact, power has more to do with the status of a po-
litical force than the conditions under which it can preserve it, assuming force as  
a physical aggression at the forefront. In a sense, the relation of cooperation may be also 
viewed as a single mode of power obtained with the help of other means within a set of 
peaceful relations. Nevertheless, power is usually viewed as a one-sided action used by 
a single state for its unilateral interest. If power corresponds to a general situation of satis-
faction, however, its necessary and sufficient conditions are not given unanimously among 
the theorists. For the ones, power requires violence as the best defense of its own interests 
against the others’ (Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Schmitt, and Huntington); for the 
others, it requires peace in order to ensure a standing and fruitful cooperation between po-
tential partners (Rousseau, Kant, Fukuyama). Actually, the characterization of power de-
pends on how mankind and societies are viewed from an anthropological perspective. No 
wonder if the historical context contributes to the answers, as witnessed by, for example, 
the role played by the bloody civil war of England on Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and 
his subsequent anthropological pessimism. Hence his words from the Leviathan (ch. XI), 
‘In the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless 
desire of power after power, that ceases only in death’. A similar description of mankind 
as a perpetual quest for maximizing power can be also found in the concepts of conatus 
(any effort to persist in being) by Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), or the concept of will of 
power (‘Wille zur Macht’) by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). Between war and peace 
as preconditions for power, a primary dichotomy thereby occurred within the theory of IR 
between liberalism (or idealism) and realism. Marxism was introduced into IR only after 
the Second World War, to account for the economical relations between states.  
Whatever the answer given to the sources of power, each of these stands for a given 
paradigm, that is, a system of assumptions, concepts, values, and practices that constitutes 
a way of viewing reality. The role of paradigms in the theoretical construction of IR was 
represented as follows:  
Etymologically speaking, ‘paradigm’ means ‘declination’ and, without altering the sense, 
we can accept the view that paradigm functions as a dogma; dogma from which the sense 
of the object at hand can be gathered (Martres 2008: 37). 
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Returning to the difference between a paradigm and an ideology, the former can be 
taken to be a set of interrelated implicit beliefs whereas the latter reduces all these beliefs 
to a central one (compare with the Marxist reduction of superstructures to the economic 
infrastructure of production modes). In both cases, the problem concerns the way to organ-
ize values and the criteria attached to their political relevance. What is to be favored be-
tween economical and military power, for instance? Starting from a binary opposition be-
tween idealism and realism, the theory of IR increasingly introduced more complex data to 
explain historical events: no black-or-white scenario between either total war or total 
peace but, rather, a pale gray lore of interrelations between different agents and their 
common environment.  
A large literature on IR attempts to inject some rationality behind these international 
facts, while attempting to justify their own paradigms at hand. Let us go through a list of 
such theorists and their main assumptions.  
In response to the failure of British idealism, the American realist Hans Morgenthau 
supported a classical realism by advocating offensive power against the alleged threat of 
the Soviet Union.  
Then the complex evolution of the Cold War was paralleled by a general reflection 
about international regimes in the eighties and nineties, to do justice to the role of com-
mon objectives among the states through regular international institutions or general 
agreements.  
Although most of the theorists agree about the situation of anarchy between states (no 
higher authority rules them over and above their own sovereignty), the existence of re-
gional or worldwide organizations (UNO, NATO, and the like) refined the notion of anar-
chy in three ways: in a Hobbesian (states are mutual enemies), Lockean (states are mutual 
rivals), or Kantian (states are mutual friends) sense of the word. By augmenting the binary 
opposition friend-enemy with a third intermediary term of rivalty (following Carl Schmitt 
in this respect), Kenneth Waltz took the logic of Lockean anarchy to be the prominent way 
to understand the contemporary history (Waltz 2003); it resulted in a so-called neo-
realism, or structural realism, that differs from the classical version by strengthening the 
role of economic relations towards the global task of sustaining power.  
In other words, realists and idealists are at odds as to the fundamental objectives of  
a state; nevertheless, they may agree about the way to achieve it as in the common objec-
tive of economic growth (among the liberal-minded defenders of idealism and the neo-
realists). For example, Robert Gilpin equally defends neo-realism by arguing that econ-
omy takes growing interest in coercive relations; while Andrew Moravcsik claims that the 
rational individual is prime and supports neo-liberalism against the realist assumption of 
state-centrism. But trading is at any rate the central factor that most of the international 
relations rely upon, whether in a competing or in a friendlier way.  
Given the increasing influence of commercial relations after the Second World War 
and the ensuing hegemony of the United States, a large network of interrelations has de-
veloped between the states until then. The upshot is a number of more or less cooperative 
agreements, thus favoring a global status quo around two blocks (Western vs. Eastern 
blocks) with economic pressures and nuclear weapons as their major arguments. There-
fore, the history of the post-war world led to a number of more intricate paradigms be-
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tween the absolute relations of peace and war. On the one hand, the school of Neo-
Marxists (also known as dependency theory) emerged with Immanuel Wallerstein or Jo-
han Galtung during the period of decolonization, rendering the American hegemony in 
terms of dominant centers and dominated peripheries. On the other hand, the development 
of information through mass media strengthened the role of public opinion in the collec-
tive decisions; it followed from it some impetus on soft constructivism and transnational-
ism. The former has been famously formulated by Alexander Wendt as follows, ‘Anarchy 
is what states make of it’, in order to turn the realists' negative connotation of anarchy into 
a more positive field of rational and responsible relations between states. The latter weak-
ens the role of these states in the international relations, stressing upon the complex inter-
dependence of collective institutions around the states like non-governmental organiza-
tions and economic firms. Joseph Nye described this globalized situation in terms of soft 
power, according to which the states try to defend their interests by means of cooptation 
rather than the classical coercion of hard power. Likewise, James Rosenau argued for 
a general situation of interstate or multi-centered sphere between interdependent states. 
Again, the binary opposition of peace and war has been muddled by the historical context 
of the postwar world: Bretton Woods, oil crisis and liberal values produced a multi-polar 
framework where rigid masters and servants turned into flexible sellers and clients.  
That is a sketchy (not exhaustive) overview of the paradigms in IR, from the idealist 
sources of the theory to its interdisciplinary stance. To put all of this in order, a question 
naturally arises: How many schools or paradigms can there be in the discipline? To answer 
this question requires a capacity to specify the sort of questions that make sense of such 
worldwide relations between states or broader decision groups: the more questions there 
should be to define the properties of foreign relations, the more paradigms there can be to 
assign a definite value to each of these and establish a resulting hierarchy between them.  
Note that such a debate already occurred within the ‘Four Great Debates’ of the theory 
of IR, concerning the opposition between traditional and behaviorists: Morton Kaplan ad-
vocated the use of quantitative methods to characterize the relations between states, 
whereas Hedley Bull blamed the latter for not taking the random character of human deci-
sions into account. Between science and art, or determination and wisdom, a division oc-
curred as to the role of exact sciences while some of the writers called for the knowledge 
of balance theory, game theory of complex systems to model international relations. Does 
it make sense to use formal tools into a social science, insofar as the latter primarily deals 
with agent's intentions? How to find room inside such a debate between positivists and 
post-positivists, in order to make of history without reducing it to a mechanist and con-
tinuous line?  
3. The Value of the Relation: A Comparative Logic  
A general logic is to be found for the discipline, but not in the sense of explaining the oc-
currence of foreign relations by means of computing data. Rather, the point is to find 
a way to understand the reasons underlying any expected or unexpected relation between 
states or broader items like countries.  
For one thing, the theory of IR is naturally concerned with truth in two respects. It 
ought to respect the criteria of formal (or logical) truth as any normal science, insofar as 
science aims at truth by obeying criteria like consistency. Moreover, it is obviously con-
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cerned with material truth but should not access to it by a mere observation of allegedly 
bare facts: again, facts and interpretations cannot be disentangled in scientific theories. To 
discard the black-and-white picture of reality, Quine (1960: 374) noticed the point that 
‘The lore of our fathers is a fabric of sentences. A pale gray lore, black with fact and white 
with convention’. This means that one and the same political relation may take different 
meanings in different theories, that is depending upon the paradigm adopted to make sense 
of it. A way has been devised to go beyond the naïve distinction between facts and inter-
pretations, thus referring to the Chinese Yixing that emerged during the Warring States 
Period (around 475–221 BC) for political motivations. Thus,  
it is easy to imagine, by resorting to the fundamental matrices of Chinese thought, the con-
struction of a theory of international relations which, ignoring the Western binary distinc-
tion between Good and Evil, would give a much better account of the genuine sense of in-
ternational politics (Martres 2008: 36). 
I see a connection between this Eastern reference and IR, since I developed elsewhere 
(see Schang 2011) a translation of the Yiking in the form of Boolean bitstrings that ex-
press the context-sensitive identity of any meaningful sources of information. In our pre-
sent case, this purports to give a definite number of criteria to characterize the identity of 
context-sensitive countries within our globalized world. 
Consider a ‘guess-who’ game for IR, assuming that there is a finite number of maxi-
mally relevant questions to define the foreign relations between countries. Let us say that 
any yes-answer corresponds to an agreement, that is a friendly relation between two relata 
a and b, whereas any no-answer expresses a disagreement, that is an unfriendly relation 
between them. Four questions are meant to discriminate international relations between 
countries, viz. q1: ‘military agreement?’; q2: ‘economic agreement?’; q3: ‘cultural agree-
ment?’; q4: ‘social agreement?’. The source of agreement between countries relates to 
what is investigated in geopolitics, and the previous questions represent a set of meta-
questions to assess such relations. Indeed, any agreement between countries can be estab-
lished by the existence of international alliances, whether military, economical, or even 
cultural: EU, NATO, NAFTA, Mercosur, and the like. It can also be obtained according to 
the compatibility of their political system (democracy, dictatorship, etc.), their population 
(ethnical, religious kinship), or their standard of living (employment, way of life, mentali-
ties). Furthermore, the main import of paradigms is to establish a hierarchy between the 
previous domains included into the questions: the realists favor military over economic 
criterion; and the other way around for the liberals. In a context-sensitive process of identi-
fication, the relations are defined from a reference country to make sense of the answers.  
Following some previous works about the logic of opposition in Schang (2012), let us 
state that the logical value of a country varies according to this basic reference of a coun-
try. In the context of the Cold War, for example, the United States could be given as such 
a reference (or hegemonic) country. What are the foreign relations between the latter and 
other countries like Yugoslavia, the USSR, France, or Poland? Let ‘1’ be the symbol of 
a yes-answer and ‘0’ be a no-answer, this yields a set of logical values (an ordered set of 
answers A) to our preceding four questions: A(Yugoslavia) – 0100, A(USSR) – 0000, 
A(France) – 1110, and A(Poland) – 0010. Following the definition of the logical relations 
of opposition, any two countries are said to stand into a normal friendship if and only if 
they are subcontrary to each other – they have at last one common yes-answer, while they 
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stand into a mere non-friendship (as either rivals or enemies) if and only if they are con-
tradictory or even contrary to each other – they have no common yes-answer. How to 
make sense of the difference between contradiction and contrariety in IR, taking to be 
granted that such logical relations lead to a mutually hostile relation? Let us say that any 
two countries are mutual enemies whenever they are incompatible relata, and friends (al-
lies) as compatible relata. Insofar as international relations are more dynamic than static 
processes, we can refer to a relation of political integration between a given country and 
a reference country whenever there are more yes-answers than no-answers between them; 
as to the relation of political assimilation, it means that there are only yes-answers (no dis-
tinction) between these. A political preference between countries can be stated as follows: 
any country a prefers b to c if and only if the logical value of b is less different with a's 
one than c's one is. A balance of power obtains within a set of related countries once these 
are balanced poles with equivalent forces (logical values).  
In accordance to the notion of hegemony, the assumed hierarchy within friendly 
groups can be determined by their power measurement. Thus, a country can be said to be 
strong according to a set of criteria. The military criterion includes army capacity, techni-
cal equipment, and nuclear force. The economic criterion relies upon features like self-
sufficiency, or business resources (production, subsoil resources). The cultural criterion 
can be equated with cultural data like the religious or linguistic sources of a country. Fi-
nally, the social criterion refers to some inner harmony from base (public opinion) to tip 
(state). Now what is the hierarchy between these criteria themselves? It depends upon 
which paradigms are mentioned to order them, and a criterion for measurement can make 
use of coefficients in this respect (see Fig. 1). That is, the power of a country (superpower, 
average power, lower power) is characterized by the sum of its coefficients, and a refer-
ence country corresponds to any country such that its sum is maximal in a given pole (set 
of countries).  
To sum up, such a question-answer game results in a logic of IR that wants to account 
for the difference between enemies, rivals, and friends by more fine-grained relations than 
unique yes- and no-answers.  
There are some advantages in such a game. On the one hand, no quantitative methods 
from natural science have been used in the preceding presentation. As a reply to post-
positivists, this means that not any logical approach to the IR leads to mechanic equations. 
On the other hand, such an ‘IR game’ goes beyond the realist paradigm by taking into ac-
count the role of paradigms through the various coefficients assigned to each ordered 
question (definitional criterion of context-sensitive countries). 
There are some defects related to these political oppositions, however. Firstly,  
the number of questions required to individuate countries remains undetermined. Sec-
ondly, the logical calculus hinges upon paradigms which lead to a variable hierarchy of the 
criteria. Thirdly, there may be some interdependence between the given criteria of econ-
omy, culture, and social condition (following the statements of Marxists and constructiv-
ists). Fourthly, the amount of a given coefficient should be given by means of quantitative 
measurements after all; while it arguably corresponds to a quantity of efficient equipment 
in the military domains, any quantification of the cultural or social areas is a more trouble-
some affair. 
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Fig. 1. The criteria of power and their coefficients according to three main  
paradigms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A number of technical challenges remain open within such a logic of IR and its founda-
tions, accordingly. Let us quote three of these. Two of these are about the nature of foreign 
relations: Why need not ‘the enemies of my enemies’ be my friends (calculus of oppo-
sites)? How can a given country prefer a to b, b to c, but not a to c (compare with the so-
called Condorcet's Paradox)? Another one is about the criterion of identity and unity be-
tween countries: what makes them politically differ, and how many questions are required 
to individuate them (so as to make them minimally distinct from each other)? 
4. Conclusion and Prospects (So What?) 
Let us summarize the main statements of the present paper, before recalling its expected 
developments.  
a) The theory of IR is centered on countries, rather than states. 
b) It relies upon a variety of paradigms. 
These can be summarized in two main questions, namely: what the countries want 
above all, and how they proceed for this purpose. The variety of corresponding answers 
leads to a variety of paradigms, mostly based upon two core concepts: force (to be op-
posed to cooperation, and distinguished from the broader notion of power) and state. Thus, 
realism emphasizes the role of states to maximize the force of any homogeneous country; 
and conversely, liberals tamper the notion of power in the sense of a cooperative relation 
while sustaining the central role of states in the realm of international relations.  
c) No such paradigm normally prevails over the others, because IR is a social science.  
As a matter of fact, this sensibly differs from what is meant by a ‘normal’ science as 
any discipline which ought to change its theory after a scientific revolution: according to 
Thomas Kuhn's related works, the uniqueness of paradigms in natural science is warranted 
by the fact that the rule of consistency prevents several paradigms from ruling a given sci-
ence at once. If so, then IR proceeds as a non-normal science accordingly. 
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d) IR is an interdisciplinary social science requiring an investigation into human be-
liefs and intentions.  
Such a context-sensitive discipline must cope with randomness, thus leading to a set 
of unpredictable coefficients in the ‘IR game’. 
Fig. 2. A diagram for IR through two main imports: force and state 
         State 
         +    ● Realism 
● Liberalism 
       ● Neo-Marxism 
 
     
            
           –              + Force 
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● Transnationalism 
    – 
 
This formal epistemology of IR gives room for a number of prospects to implement its 
content. Three of these can be stated as follows. For one thing, the ontology of IR is based 
on countries, hence the need of a contemporary history of countries to characterize their 
relative identity and subsequent relations. Then, the role of opinions with respect to the 
construction of public opinions demands an investigation into mass media as belief form-
ers; such is the task of a so-called mediology. Last, but not least, the crucial role of criteria 
to make sense of relations between dynamic countries assumes a preliminary analysis of 
paradigms in the theory of IR. 
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